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Abstract 
Residential retail competition in electricity supply was introduced in many countries and 
some US states as part of electricity industry deregulation. Following problems in the 
electricity market in California in 2000/2001 many US states, including North Carolina, 
suspended their deregulation agenda. Recent technological advances have made 
competition more viable, so we ask if NC should reconsider deregulation and retail 
competition. The welfare benefits will depend on consumers’ willingness to switch 
suppliers and the potential for value added innovations. In electricity and industries such 
as pay-tv and telecommunications consumers are ‘sticky’, remaining with their current 
supplier even though rivals offer savings. Moreover, some analysts question the 
likelihood of significant welfare improvements from retail competition. We survey 
residents in two NC counties focusing on: (i) households’ knowledge of and interest in 
retail competition, (ii) factors that would encourage them to switch suppliers and (iii) the 
required savings to encourage switching. About 50–65% of respondents would favor 
retail competition in NC. Demographic variables and experience switching in other 
industries affect opinions and the savings required to incent switching. We conclude the 
estimated rate reduction to encourage competitive switching will be hard to achieve in 
NC as long as rates remain below the national average. 
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1. Introduction 
Competition in retail electricity supply has been introduced in many countries around the 
world and is a mandate for European Union member states. In the US, 15 states plus 
the District of Columbia have introduced retail competition but most states have a non-
active deregulation agenda for the electricity industry. Federal regulatory Acts and 
Orders helped to lay the foundation for wholesale and retail competition in the US. 
Three notable examples were the 1992 Energy Policy Act and Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) Orders 888 and 889 of 1996. The 1992 Act 
empowered “FERC to order vertically integrated electric utilities to deliver competitive 
generated power over their transmission lines to wholesale customers, a process known 
as wholesale wheeling (Sidak and Spulber, 1998).” The 1996 Orders made the 1992 
Energy Act more comprehensive by requiring transmission operators to allow open 
access to their networks on the basis of non-discriminatory tariffs. Order 888 also 
contained a concession from regulators to the incumbent utilities allowing them to 
recover stranded investments and recoup costs made before deregulation that may not 
have been cost effective under competition. 
 
Retail electricity competition potentially includes sales to all electricity customers: 
industrial, commercial, small business and residential. Markets for smaller customers, 
particularly residential, present significant challenges to the competitive market model. 
In this paper we ask if one US state, North Carolina (NC), should reconsider retail 
competition in electricity supply. Our focus is on the residential market or residential 
retail competition (hereafter, RRC). NC is not unlike adjacent states in size and the 
generation fuel mix, but we do not attempt to extrapolate our results beyond NC. 
 
Using survey data, we estimate factors affecting the desirability of RRC to residential 
consumers in Western NC. We discuss three basic questions. First, what is the current 
level of familiarity with retail competition and what characteristics result in individuals 
being more favorable toward it? Second, what supply options (not currently received) 
would entice households to consider an alternative supplier? Third, holding supply 
characteristics constant, how much would the monthly electricity bill have to decline to 
encourage switching? 
 
Research on the feasibility of retail competition in many US states has tapered off since 
the breakdown of the competitive market in California in 2001. Fig. 1 a and b shows the 
status of restructuring efforts in the US in 2001 and in 2010, respectively. In the figure 
for 2010 we have superimposed the average residential price for electricity in 1998, 2 
years after FERC Orders 888 and 889. We chose to illustrate prices in 1998 because, 
although the restructuring debate and requisite (federal) legislation occurred earlier, 
restructuring and/or competition itself was beginning in some markets at that time (e.g., 
California and Massachusetts). Average prices go a long way in explaining restructuring 
efforts across states. In most currently “active states” the average retail price was above 
the national average in 1998; the two exceptions were Texas and Oregon. In contrast, 
all the “not active” states excluding Iowa, Alaska and Hawaii had rates below the 
national average. The “suspended” states had rates roughly in line with the national 
average apart from California, one of the earliest states to restructure. Overall, the 
average price in active states was 10.32¢/kWh while in suspended and non-active 
states it was 8.09¢ and 6.32¢, respectively (excluding Alaska and Hawaii where rates 
were well above the national average). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Source EIA. (b) Restructing as of September 2010: EIA. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html. Real residential 
prices (¢/kWh), 1998. US average residential price by State by Provider (EIA-861). 
 
In April 2000 a commission on the Future of Electric Service recommended to the NC 
state legislator that deregulation take place by January 2005 with 50% of customers 
being given supply choice at that time and the remainder a year later. By January 2001 
these plans were postponed.3 Comparing the maps in Fig. 1a and b it is clear that many 
states backed off on their restructuring plans following events in California. 
 
Early discussions and academic pursuits about electricity industry restructuring focused 
on creating and improving markets for power generation. This, in many cases, involved 
breaking up integrated companies into transmission, generation, and retail functions. 
The natural monopoly transmission segments of the market were separated from the 
potentially competitive generation and retail functions. In some markets, such as Great 
Britain, and some regions such as Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland (PJM) this 
process moved forward relatively quickly. In the England and Wales market (which has 
since been expanded to include Scotland) the restructuring process began in the late 
1980s and early 1990s and the residential market was opened to competition as early 
as 1998. The US market by contrast is more complex and segmented, and many 
policies are determined at the state level. Not surprisingly, the process has been slower 
in the US. 
 
Today, restructuring and energy efficiency goals are very focused on the demand side 
of the market. There is an expectation that demand side changes will lead to more 
innovations and value added than continued emphasis on cost cutting at the wholesale 
level: 
 
“Arguably most of the efficiency gains from restructuring will come from the demand 
side…Unfortunately, nearly all markets have paid too little attention to the demand side, 
and many markets began by effectively killing retail competition. This is unfortunate, 
since the much needed innovation on demand management systems and contracts is 
likely to come from retail competition.” (Cramton, 2003, p. 6). 
 
Joskow (2000) discusses various ways retail competition could provide value added. 
For example: 
 
“…the primary social value of increasing [the] role of [electricity service providers] is to 
provide enhanced customer services which provide value added to consumers over and 
above what consumers realize by purchasing at wholesale through the [electric 
distribution company]. These services include enhanced metering and control 
technologies, price and consumption hedge contracts, total energy management 
services, bundling of a gas, electric, telephone service…” (Joskow, 2000, p. 5) 
 
Defeuilley, 2009a and Defeuilley, 2009b suggests RRC has (to date) failed to deliver on 
some expected benefits, such as innovation. He states that new entrants have not been 
able to gain a lasting competitive advantage partly because new tools such as ‘web 
based auditing” and “energy management software” are easily reproducible (p. 382). 
Moreover, he cites the existence of two consumer markets (active and inactive) and the 
differences in prices for those consumer groups as evidence of consumer inertia. Inertia 
persists for various reasons including the (perceived or real) complexity of comparing 
offers and switching suppliers. 
 
The use of time varying prices promotes demand side management and would add 
value in the industry if demand elasticity increased. Indeed there is evidence from pilot 
studies that time varied electricity prices such as ‘time of use’ and ‘critical peak pricing’ 
can substantially reduce peak demand, particularly when consumers have access to 
enabling technologies that allow them to automate appliances (e.g., Faruqui and 
Sergici, 2010). However, this need not be a result of competition. Nakajima and Hamori 
(2010) do not find significant differences in the price elasticity of demand between 
regulated and deregulated states. Using panel data for cross sections of the US 
including (i) all states (plus DC), (ii) all regulated states and (iii) all deregulated states, 
they suggest, “It can be said…retail electricity market deregulation has not made 
ordinary electricity consumers more sensitive to electricity rates, and that retail 
deregulation policies are not the cause of price elasticity differences between 
deregulated and non-deregulated states” (p. 2475). 
 
There remain important downsides and uncertainties associated with RRC. The 
anticipated costs and potential for abuse are greater for residential customers relative to 
industrial and commercial customers, and devising default services for customers 
unlikely to switch suppliers (while maintaining a margin for competitive entry) is a 
challenge. Moreover, for competition to benefit consumers and for them to embrace the 
possibilities, it must be easy to compare prices, monitor energy use, switch suppliers 
and switch again if problems arise. States are taking advantage of the internet to 
educate consumers and make price comparisons simpler. For example, The Texas 
Electric Choice, and Pennsylvania’s PA Power Switch websites help consumers 
compare prices and choose new suppliers.5 Software is also available to help 
consumers monitor their use. Google PowerMeter offers customers fitted with a smart 
meter the ability to see how much power their home is using. A local power company, 
Blue Ridge Electric, has a webpage explaining to its smart meter customers how to 
install and use this Google software.6 Consumers without consistent internet access 
and some older residential customers would be disadvantaged, however, if the Internet 
became the primary source of information dissemination. This disadvantage could be 
minimized through the use of aggregated communities of individuals, some of whom will 
be better informed than others. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the survey 
design, the counties surveyed and our results. In Section 3 we discuss our results in 
light of evidence from the US states that have deregulated, and in Section 4 we offer 
our conclusions. 
 
2. Survey and data analysis 
Two North Carolina counties were chosen for the survey. Watauga County is located in 
the mountains in the northwest part of the state. The population is approximately 46,000 
and peak energy use occurs in the winter. The town of Boone and Appalachian State 
University are in Watauga County. Forsyth County is more urban and warmer though 
still located in the northwest portion of the state. Forsyth has a population of 
approximately 360,000; Winston Salem is the largest city and Wake Forest and Winston 
Salem University both are in Forsyth County. 
 
The mail survey was conducted in October and November 2009. The first mailing 
consisted of 2100 households, half in Watauga County and half in Forsythe County, 
North Carolina. Both were random samples of all county residences purchased from 
Survey Sampling International. Approximately 10% of the surveys were undelivered, 
leaving us with 891 delivered in Watauga and 991 in Forsythe. A follow-up postcard was 
sent to all households approximately 1 week after the initial mailing. Excluding bad 
addresses, a second mailing of the full survey was sent to all non-responders 3 weeks 
later. In total we received 372 responses from Watauga households (42% of delivered 
surveys) and 357 responses from Forsyth households (36% of delivered surveys). 
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of our sample. 
 
Table 1. Demographic data. 
 
 
In general, we find that fewer than half the sample respondents in both counties are 
currently familiar with retail competition but more than half would favor it. Similarly, 
approximately three-quarters consider it important to be able to choose their electricity 
provider. We also asked responders about their experience switching suppliers in other 
industries. Approximately 30% of the overall sample had switched either their telephone 
or television provider in the past 3 years. This experience might affect how comfortable 
they are with the process of changing providers and may also affect their attitude toward 
competition in utility markets. 
 
In Table 2, we focuses on what attributes of service would entice responders to switch 
to an alternative provider, assuming all other aspects of their service remained the 
same. 
 
Table 2. Switching preferences. 
 
 
We find that access to smart matters, incentives to weatherize and a free green energy 
option would all encourage a majority of respondent to switch providers. Green energy 
options with a fee increase would only encourage about a third of respondents to 
change providers. The data in Table 2 underestimate the actual percentages because 
subjects who responded that their provider already offers green options or incentives to 
weatherize are not included (approximately 19% of the overall sample). We did not 
include improved reliability as a reason to switch since current providers continue to 
maintain the distribution lines under most competition models in the US. 
 
Finally, we present the results from the regression analysis. Our dependent variable is 
‘savings’, the amount a household stated their electricity bill would have to fall (all else 
equal) to encourage them to switch to another supplier. The distribution of responses is 
shown in Table 3. The data for the value question were coded at the midpoint of the 
intervals in Table 3 except for ‘More than $20’ which was coded as 25. We therefore 
estimated a Tobit model allowing for both left and right hand censoring (at 2 and 25). 
The Tobit model specification is: y⁎=x′β+ε where ε is a continuous random variable with 
mean zero and variance σ2. yi ⁎ is a latent variable with 
 
 
 
Table 3. Savings required to switch providers. 
 
 
The expected value of the dependent variable is 
 
 
 
where a and b are constants taking on values of 2 and 25, respectively, in our model. 
 
As a check on the sign and significance of the results, we also estimated an ordered 
logit model where the dependent variable is the ordinal value of responses; e.g., 0–4 
was coded as 1, etc. The ‘don't know’ responses were excluded. These results are 
shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Tobit models with marginal effects. Ordered logit with robust standard errors. y=savings. 
p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
Model 1 does not control for respondents’ prior experience switching providers in other 
industries (priorswitch) or whether they favor competition (favor). These controls are 
added in models two and three. The results for the demographic variables do not 
change substantially when these two variables are included. 
 
Respondents with a college education require less savings to switch suppliers than 
those with a high school education, and adding professional/post-graduate education 
lowers the savings more. Of course, education is correlated with income which is also 
significant but positive.11 Age and race are negative and significant meaning older 
respondents require less savings to switch and whites require less than non-whites.12 
Being favorable towards competition and having experience switching in other 
industries reduces respondents required savings also. 
 
To determine characteristics that make respondents more favorable toward competition 
we estimated a logit model with the form 
 
 
 
 
These results are shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Logit model, y=favor retail competition (p-values). 
 
 
 
Respondents with either a college education or a professional degree are both more 
favorable towards competition than those with a high school education but the 
coefficient on the professional degree is only significant at the 10% level. Males are also 
somewhat more likely to favor competition than females. Lastly having experience 
switching in other industries increases the probability of favoring competition between 
electricity providers suggesting that individuals who have switched either their telephone 
or television suppliers find these choices beneficial and would like to have them 
available in the electrical market. 
 
3. Discussion 
Fig. 2 and Table 6 show that North Carolina has residential electricity rates below the 
national average; Table 6 shows the rates for the four providers in our survey areas. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Fuel and residential prices. ¢/kWh not adjusted for inflation. Source: EIA. Average Retail 
Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers: Total by End-Use Sector, 1997 through December 2011, 
Short term energy outlook (March 6, 2012). Power generation fuel costs; $/million BTU converted 
to cents/kWh using 1 million BTU=293.071 kWh. 
 
Table 6. Rates and ownership for the electricity companies in our survey area. 
 
 
New River Light and Power Company is owned by Appalachian State University and 
has a very small, dense customer base in downtown Boone, North Carolina. Blue Ridge 
Electric services other areas of Boone and the remainder of Watauga County. Duke 
Energy supplies most of the customers in Forsyth County; a few are served by Energy 
United. 
 
Based on model 2 the probability of ‘savings’ being uncensored and the conditional 
predicted value of ‘savings’ are 
 
 
 
The conditional (censored) reduction on the electricity bill that would incent customers 
to switch suppliers is $15.30/month across the two counties (all else equal). To compute 
a rough estimate of the equivalent reduction in tariff rates we use summary data for NC 
as a whole. The average monthly residential consumption in NC for 2008 was 
1120 kWh; the average bill was $106.61 and the average price was 9.52¢/kWh. A 
reduction in the monthly bill of $15.30 would be a reduction of approximately 14.35% a 
month or 1.37¢/kWh. 
 
Determining if this is a realistic rate reduction is problematic, but we can look to the 
experience of the US states that have introduced retail competition. As discussed in 
Kwoka (2008) some states introduced competition as early as 1996 and rates were 
initially capped to allow utilities to recover stranded costs. Rate caps made market entry 
unattractive and the impact of competition on retail prices could not therefore be 
accurately determined. In many cases those caps have now expired, however. Swadley 
and Yücel (2011) use a dynamic panel analysis including 16 US states plus the District 
of Columbia to analyze factors contributing to price changes following the introduction of 
competition. Their sample period spans 1990–2010. In their model consumer 
switching/participation is a significant determinant of residential rates, but with a lag. 
They find that increasing participation by 10% lowers the residential price by 4.3% 6 
months later. State specific restructuring plans are important in their results as is the 
marginal generation fuel. They explain that Maine provides a ‘standard offer service’ 
that procures generation competitively. As such, many consumers are part of the 
competitive market (and pay lower rates) though they are not active switchers. This is 
akin to the Basic Electricity Service (BES) Joskow (2000) favors. He argues a BES 
“option provided by the [electric distribution companies] that allows retail customers to 
buy directly from the wholesale market should be the benchmark against which the 
social benefits of retail competition and the best mechanisms to realize these benefits 
should be judged…successful retail competition should provide value-added services to 
customers over and above what they can realize through direct access to the wholesale 
market” (p. 4). In Joskow’s view the fact that consumer switching is low is not an 
indication of competitive market failure. The incentives and scope to provide value 
added services indicate how successful the competitive transition is or will be. 
 
In Swadley and Yücel’s model both coal and natural gas affect residential rates (with a 
lag), and where natural gas is marginal (e.g., Texas, California, New York and New 
England), fuel prices affect rates significantly more when the market is competitive; 
competition does not change the effect of fuel prices on rates when coal is marginal, 
however. Fig. 2 shows nominal coal and natural gas prices between 1997 and 2010 and 
illustrates that coal prices have been steadier than natural gas prices. The figure also 
shows the gap between retail and industrial prices in the US. Industrial prices tend to be 
close to wholesale price, particularly where there is competition. 
 
Fig. 3 shows that NC is heavily dependent on coal and nuclear for electricity production 
and uses little natural gas. Swadley and Yücel (2011, Table 2) show the generation mix 
for the deregulated states included in their study. Of those states, NC’s generation mix 
is similar to Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Virginia (which has 
suspended its deregulation efforts). Swadley and Yücel note that retail competition has 
been less successful to date in coal intensive states (with exceptions, notably 
Pennsylvania). They show that retail prices fell in Pennsylvania after the market became 
competitive but note that not all price controls had expired over their period of analysis. 
Of the other coal intensive states that are currently competitive (Illinois, Maryland and 
Michigan) they instead find that retail prices increased following deregulation. The 
participation rate (i.e., the percentage of consumers taking competitive supply) in these 
states was very low over their sample period. 
 
Fig. 3. Generation mix for NC and the US. Source: EIA, Electric Power Annual. Net Generation total 
electric power industry by energy source, 2010. 
 
In Texas, where retail competition began in 2002 and has largely been viewed as a 
success, price caps expired in 2007. Kang and Zarnikau (2009) show evidence that 
prices have since begun to fall. The electricity industry in Texas is heavily reliant on 
natural gas, so electricity prices rose steadily along with natural gas prices in 2004 and 
2005. According to Kang and Zarnikau, electricity prices remained high even when 
natural gas prices began declining in 2006 (Fig. 1, p. 1715). Zarnikau and Whitworth 
(2006) discuss that most residential customers have chosen to remain on a (regulated) 
price-to-beat contract as opposed to switching to a competitive supplier. These price-to-
beat tariffs are not the same as the BES Joskow (2000) proposes and were initially 
offered at a discount that left little margin for potential competitors. 
 
A state’s experience with retail competition will depend on its policy towards stranded 
cost recovery, strategies for providing default services to customers who choose not to 
switch suppliers, the current generation mix, consumers’ attitudes and the scope for 
suppliers to innovate. North Carolina's access to cheap coal has kept prices below the 
national average, but prices could increase as the state's commitment to greener 
technologies strengthens. In 2007 NC implemented a renewable energy and efficiency 
portfolio standard requiring “investor-owned utilities to supply 12.5% of their electricity 
from renewable and efficiency sources by 2021, and municipal electric suppliers and 
rural electric cooperatives to supply 10% by 2018.”16 Higher tariffs from increased 
reliance on renewables could encourage innovation, and the support for competition 
could improve despite higher rates. The use of smart meters could bring down 
competitors’ costs, but not necessarily below the incumbents’ (some of which have 
already rolled out smart meters). 
 
4. Conclusion 
We conducted a mail survey of two disparate counties in western North Carolina to 
gage consumers’ opinions about retail competition among electricity providers and to 
estimate their required savings to switch providers. Just under half of our respondents 
claimed to know something about electricity retail competition; about 75% of responders 
in each county believe it is important that consumers be able to choose their utility 
provider, and 50–65% favor retail competition in NC. Our results show that respondents 
with undergraduate and post-graduate education are more likely to favor competition 
than those without college experience, and males are somewhat more likely to favor 
competition than females. Respondents who have recently switched television or phone 
providers are more likely to favor competition, and they would require less savings to 
switch than those who have not recently switched providers in these other industries. 
On average households state they would be willing to switch electricity providers (all 
else equal) for a rate reduction of approximately 1.4¢/kWh. There were no strong 
differences between the two counties. 
 
Given that prices in NC are still regulated and below the national average, savings of 
this magnitude are currently unlikely; evidence from other states suggests alternative 
suppliers would be unable to compete at such rates. So the answer to the question: 
“Should NC reconsider retail competition?” Our survey of residential consumers 
suggests that from a purely consumer welfare perspective the answer is no. If, however, 
retail competition encourages cost savings on the production side, or if it is implemented 
only for industrial and commercial consumers, then the answer might be yes but is 
beyond the scope of our analysis. 
 
In the future we would like to conduct a larger study of the southeastern US to form a 
better picture of consumer preferences in this part of the country where electricity has 
been historically cheap due largely to the dominance of coal (and some nuclear) in the 
generation mix. In addition we plan to study demand side management by asking if 
consumers are willing to use smart grid technologies with time varying pricing as well as 
conservation measures to reduce energy use. 
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